

Demographic Changes and Human Security of Syrian Refugees

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Since the start of the civil war in Syria several major demographic shifts have taken place in the region. Syrian families are becoming members of ethnic minority groups in Jordan and Lebanon. The study shows that the influx of refugees is affecting the age structure, population rate, and the socio-economic structure of the communities. It is also affecting the sectarian and religious balance in Lebanon. The study also reveals that despite all the activities conducted by the international community to support the refugees in the region they lack the different dimensions of human security. The article examines how the demographic change in the host countries along with the lack of human security of the refugees could affect the national security in the host countries.

This article presents statistics of Syrian migration in Lebanon and Jordan, while reflecting their status in the host countries. The statistics will help identify the demographic change in the host countries under study (Lebanon and Jordan). The article will also help examine the human security status of the Syrian migrants. Human Security includes the essential dimensions illustrated in the 1994 Global Human Development Report. Barry Buzan's dimensions of human security include political security, personal security, community security, health security, environment security, food security, and economic security.

Conflict in Syria started with a protest movement against the regime in February 2011, which marked the point of no return and eventually led to collapse. Several parties were part of the disputes and the country became torn apart. Thousands were killed and millions were forced to leave their homes due to fear of hunger and death and the demolition of their homes. Many sought refuge in neighboring countries including Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, while other paid traffickers to facilitate their movement to Europe risking death, capture and deportation. Thousands of Syrians flee their country on a daily basis. They are forced to leave after their neighborhood is demolished and staying in their homes is risky; however, the journey out of the country holds even greater risk.

Although different neighboring countries hosted Syrian refugees, this article focuses only on Jordan and Lebanon. These two countries were chosen as they faced previous refugee influxes from Palestine in 1948 and 1967, as a result of which demographic changes took place and conflicts arose affecting the national security of both countries. Jordan and Lebanon are also considered small countries compared to the huge influx of refugees leading to a high per capita concentration of refugees. Moreover, partly due to the Palestinian refugee influx neither Jordan nor Lebanon ratified the international

refugee convention of 1951 and its protocol, as a result of which the living conditions of refugees is worse depending on the local policies of each country.

Literature has discussed the status of immigrants within the different communities. Several factors were identified as threats to human security. In 2005, Sokoloff and Lewis¹ stated that one of the major factors is the lack of acceptance and integration, which affects the protection and empowerment making the group vulnerable. Weiner & Russell,² on the other hand, indicated that immigration has a major effect on demography, which in turn influences politics. The presence of refugees affects the age and gender composition of the host countries. Moreover, Teitelbaum³ declared that immigration affects demographic change and hence increases ethnic conflicts.

Demographic Changes

Although Syrian refugees travelled to the different parts of the world, the most significant influx was towards the neighboring countries. Turkey received the highest number of refugees (1,761,486); however, Lebanon's case is the worst having now the highest per capita concentration of refugees (receiving 1,183,327 individuals) in the world. Table (1) below identifies the exact numbers of refugees in the neighboring countries according to the UNHCR statistics of 2015.⁴

Table 1.: Distribution of the Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries

Neighboring Host Country	Number of Syrian Refugees
Turkey	1,761,486
Lebanon	1,183,327
Jordan	628,160
Iraq	249,266
Egypt	134,329

Demographic change in Lebanon

The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been constantly increasing and reached its peak in 2013 placing a strain on humanitarian resources. At this point the Lebanese Government imposed strict entry requirements to limit the number of refugees increasing day after the other. However, these barriers led to the increasing number of illegal migration in all directions. The changing demographic landscape has affected the different regions and structures in Lebanon including the population and the religious structure.

1 Sokoloff-Lewis (2005)

2 Weiner-Russell (2000)

3 Teitelbaum (1995)

4 UNHCR (2015)

Demographic changes in Lebanon are possible to bring the country back to the brink of civil war given the history of the region and the nature of the demographic structure. The civil war in Lebanon erupted in 1975 as a result of internal and external factors; the article will only discuss the two factors relevant to the current status of the problem. The first factor is that the distribution of power ceased to reflect the demographic trends in Lebanon especially that the political system was distributed among religious sects in accordance with the population distribution. The second factor is the entrenchment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon with a high number of refugees that was able to gain and use power over the regions they control.

After the civil war Lebanon developed a unique system that allocates political and administrative functions to the major sects through the *Taif Agreement*, which was considered as basis for ending the civil war.⁵ This agreement helped stabilize the surface of the conflict. Hence, any change may make this volcano erupt again.

There are four main regions in Lebanon including six governorates; these are Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon (including South Lebanon and El-Nabatieh); each has its own religious and socio-economic structure.

Beirut and Mount Lebanon form the main urban areas where half of Lebanon's population resides. This region includes most of the economic and industrial activities. The two distinct regions are marked by unique characteristics; Beirut could be considered as a melting pot including all religions and confessions;⁶ hence, it is a region welcoming diversity. However, it is a region with high standards of living. Therefore it is hard for Syrian refugees to cope with these conditions. Mount Lebanon is predominantly Christian. Hence, immigration from Sunni Muslims will affect the structure of this region, which is also characterized by its high standards of living. This region includes four Palestinian refugee camps: Shatila, Burj, El-Barajneh, Mar Elias, and Dbayieh. The Palestinian refugee camps were a refuge that Palestinian Refugees from Syria sought. Originally, these camps were barely providing sufficient services for its people (59,000 refugees), and were overcrowded even before the new immigrants (9,300) arrived. Table (2) shows the percentage of Syrian refugees in the region (including the Syrian refugees awaiting registration but not including the Palestinian Refugees coming from Syria as part of the crisis) and the percentage of total refugees in Lebanon.

5 Saseen (1990)

6 OCHA (2014)

Table 2.: The distribution of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon in accordance with the governorates⁷

Region	Lebanese population	Registered Syrian refugees	Syrian refugees awaiting	Palestinian refugees	Palestinian refugees from Syria	Percentage of Syrian refugees in the region	Percentage of refugees in the region
Beirut and Mount Lebanon	1,910,912	338,335	7,787	59,000	9,300	14.9%	17.8%
North Lebanon	807,206	285,942	940	52,000	8,400	25.0%	30.1%
Bekaa	540,000	416,127	2,062	10,000	9,000	43.2%	44.7%
South Lebanon	747,475	139,778	477	149,000	26,100	13.5%	29.7%
Total	4,005,593	1,180,182	11,266	270,000	52,800	21.8%	27.4%

North Lebanon is composed of two main regions; Tripoli and Akkar. There are more than 27 border villages with Syria along with three official crossing points. This makes this region the most targeted area. Two Palestinian refugee camps are available in the area (Naher El-Bared and Bedawi), which offered refuges to Palestinian refugees coming from Syria. Including the Palestinian refugees the percentage of refugees in the area amounts to 30.1%, which means that about one third of the population in the area is composed of refugees. One of the major Syrian civil war spillovers in Lebanon is apparent in the two neighborhoods of Bab al-Tibbaneh (mostly Sunnis) and Jabal Mohsen (mostly Alawite), which have had their clashes during the Lebanese civil war that has erupted. The two sects are divided by their different beliefs and by their opposition or support to the Assad regime. The conflict resulted in the death of 115 and injury of 827.⁸

In the Bekaa, many Syrian refugees have already been registered and many are still awaiting registration. There are three main areas of refugee concentration: Aarsal, Cen-

⁷ OCHA and UNHCR statistics of May 2015

⁸ UNHCR (2015a)

tral Bekaa and Baalbek.⁹ This area was known for the trade with Syria, which has ceased to exist affecting the economic situation in the region. Additionally, this region is still subject to shellfire from Syria. This has affected the provision of humanitarian assistance and has also affected the relationship between the refugees and the Lebanese citizens. This is the area of highest concentration of refugees; the percentage of Syrian refugees amounts to 43.2%, while the percentage of all refugees including the Palestinians amounts to 44.7%. This means that the refugees form approximately half of the population.

South Lebanon is another unique region with a high percentage of Shiite Muslims; where Shiites form 40% of the total population in Lebanon.¹⁰ This area includes five Palestinian refugee camps (Ein E-Hilweh, Mieh Mieh, Bourj Shemali, Rashidieh, El-Buss) with 23 unofficial gatherings.¹¹ Due to the conflict this region is a UNIFIL area of operation that covers the area south of the Litani River. The percentage of Syrian refugees in the area amounts to 13.5%, whereas the percentage of total refugees amounts to 29.7%.

All in all, the percentage of refugees in Lebanon is 27.4%. Hence, Syrians form more than one quarter of the population. This change in demography through the increase in population is changing the whole structure of Lebanon.

Although Lebanon is a secular country, religious affiliation distinguishes geographic locations. When you identify where a Lebanese citizen comes from, you can tell what his or her religion is. The influx of Sunni Muslims will not maintain this balance and the demographic trend will change. Almost all refugees coming from Syria are Sunni Muslims, as Alawites and Christians are either displaced to the Syrian Government regions or are not registered at the UNHCR since they are perceived as part of the Syrian Government.¹² Hence, the influx of refugees will affect the sectarian percentage on which the political system is based and agreed upon. According to the Lebanese Bureau of Statistics there are 18 religious sects recognized. These are distributed according to the data in table (3). The Sunni population will become the largest sect in Lebanon if the situation remains the same.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Hazran (2009)

¹¹ OCHA (2015b)

¹² Jasser (2014)

Table 3.: Religion Distribution before and after the Syrian refugee influx¹³

Religion	Percentage of the total population	Percentage including the Syrian Refugees
Sunni Muslim	27%	44%
Shia Muslim	27%	21%
Maronite Christian	21%	16%
Greek Orthodox	8%	6%
Druze	5.6%	4%
Greek Catholic	5%	3%
Smaller Christian Denominations	6.5%	5%

The effect is also apparent among the young generation of refugees; where 50% are below the age of 24¹⁴ – see figure (1) for an illustration of the age gender breakdown of the Syrian refugees. Additionally, this change is affecting the socio-cultural diversity through the increase in poverty due to this change; especially that many live in informal tented settlements with an alarming increase in numbers. Moreover, many areas are facing bombings and suicide attacks either on the borders coming from Syria, or within Lebanon, and it has led to the suspension of some humanitarian activities. Hence, this change is negatively perceived by the Lebanese people, and has led to abuse and discrimination against all refugees, and to the lack of acceptance of refugees. Moreover, the huge number of unregistered refugees, who are not receiving aid from any local or international organizations, leads to more poverty and extremism towards refugees and increases the social cohesion gap.




Figure 1.: Age Gender Breakdown of Syrian Refugees¹⁵

13 CIA (2015)

14 UNHCR (2015)

15 Source: data obtained from UNHCR statistics 2015

The economic status of the refugees affected the Lebanese citizens in a drastic manner. Child labor and the number of child beggars increased. The refugees are mostly with low education; one out of three is either illiterate or never attended school, and only 3% attended university education.¹⁶ As a result, most are engaged in low skilled labor, and 92% of the labor work without contract. This leads to low income, long working hours, exposure to hazards in the workplace, and lack of social security. This affected the Lebanese labor market and the economic status in general.

Demographic change in Jordan

Ever since the crisis in Syria started, Jordan has experienced a significant influx of refugees. The vast majority of those refugees came from rural areas. Since then the number of Syrian refugees has been increasing and reached its peak in 2013 placing a strain on humanitarian resources and on the capacity of the Jordanian government to cope with the crisis. Especially that Jordan has faced different faces of refugee influxes from the neighboring countries. Jordan has received a high influx of refugees from Palestine during the 1984 and the 1967 wars, then another high influx during the invasion of Kuwait. Another major influx of refugees affected Jordan during the war against Iraq, where several Iraqi landowners moved to Jordan; an influx that led to an increase in prices and a significant effect on the Jordanian economic status. And finally, the Syrian crisis started to affect Jordan drastically. At this point the Jordanian Government imposed strict entry requirements to prevent any Palestinian refugees from Syria to enter Jordan, and imposed limitations on the number of Syrian refugees increasing day after the other.

Despite the fact that Jordan did not ratify the International convention of refugees, it does consider the Syrians as refugees and has supported the establishment of three refugee camps: two in the central region of Jordan including Emirates Jordan Camp and Azraq Camp, and one in the Northern region, the well-known refugee camp in the area Zaatari Camp.

The refugees' influx was able to change the demography in Jordan. They are distributed in the different regions, a high percentage resides in the refugee camps, some in settlements and others are integrated within the society in the different cities. Table (3) below illustrates the percentage increase within the population in the different governorates in Jordan. In the central region they now form 6.5% of the population, in the south region of Jordan they form 3.4% and in the north they are of the highest percentage with 18.2%. In total the Syrian refugees form 9.8% of the total population in Jordan; that is for every 9 Jordanians there is one Syrian living in Jordan. The most affected area is Mafraq Governorate where the percentage of Syrian refugees amounted to 44%. Other regions also witnessed a large increase: Irbid with 11%, Zarqa with 7.3% and Amman with 6.5%.

¹⁶ ILO (2013)

Table 4.: The distribution of Syrian Refugees in Jordan in accordance with the governorates¹⁷

Governorate	Number of Syrian Refugees	Percentage distribution of Syrian refugees	Total population	Percentage of Syrian refugees to the total population
Central region	283,184	39.9%	4,102,200	6.5%
Amman	174,972	24.7%	2,528,500	6.5%
Balqa	20,927	3.0%	437,500	4.6%
Zarqa (Total)	76,082	10.7%	972,900	7.3%
Zarqa	51,197	7.2%		
Emirates Jordan Camp	5,989	0.8%		
Azraq Camp	18,896	2.7%		
Madaba	11,203	1.6%	163,300	6.4%
North Region	404,266	57.0%	1,815,300	18.2%
Irbid	143,029	20.2%	1,162,300	11.0%
Mafraq (Total)	241,151	34.0%	306,900	44.0%
Mafraq	158,310	22.3%		
Zaatari Camp	82,841	11.7%		
Jarash	10,699	1.5%	195,900	5.2%
Ajlun	9,387	1.3%	150,200	5.9%
South Region	21,733	3.1%	612,500	3.4%
Karak	9,377	1.3%	254,700	3.6%
Tafiela	2,047	0.3%	91,400	2.2%
Ma'an	7,280	1.0%	124,100	5.5%
Aqaba	3,029	0.4%	142,300	2.1%
Total	709,183	100.0%	6,530,000	9.8%

Not only will this influx change the demography through the number of immigrants arriving, but the large number of young immigrants will also affect the population structure.

The majority of refugees are young; according to UNHCR statistics of 2015¹⁸ 51.7% of them are under the age of 17, 44.8% between the age of 18 and 59, and 3.5% over sixty. Figure (2) below illustrates the age gender breakdown of the Syrian refugees in Jordan, which shows that the influx of refugees affects all ages, which requires all sorts

¹⁷ OCHA and UNHCR statistics of May 2015

¹⁸ UNHCR (2015)

of support of part of the Jordanian Government: educational, health, social security; all of which are not provided due to the fact that Jordan is not a signatory of the International convention of refugees.




Figure 2.: Age Gender Breakdown of Syrian Refugees¹⁹

The religious structure in Jordan has not been affected by the influx of refugees since the majority of Jordanian citizens are Sunni Muslims (97.2%) as indicated in table (5) below. The refugees are predominantly Sunni Muslims; hence, this does not shake the religious structure.

Table 5.: Religion Distribution in Jordan

Religion	Percentage of the total population
Muslim (Sunni Muslim)	97.2%
Christian	2.2%
Others	0.6%

The influx has also affected the socio-economic status in Jordan. Mainly, the refugees come from rural areas; where the refugees are mostly low schooling. 60% of those aged under 15 have never completed basic education, and only 15% completed secondary education. Hence, the refugees are mostly working as unskilled labor, while only 51% of Syrian men participate in the labor market.²⁰

Refugee status in Jordan complies with the local policies, which does not allow Syrian refugees to work. Therefore, most work illegally without permits; hence, they have no work contracts. This illegal status made it possible to exploit labor and refugees in all aspects. This leads to low pay, long working hours, and no social security. As a result, it affects the Jordanian labor market and competition especially with low skilled labor; where unemployment as a result increased from 14.5 to 22.1%.²¹

¹⁹ Source: data obtained from UNHCR statistics 2015

²⁰ Stave-Hillesund (2015)

²¹ Ibid

Human Security of Syrian Refugees

This section analyzes the human security of the Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon and Jordan. The analysis is based on the seven components of human security mentioned in the UNDP's Human Development Report of 1994. The following are the seven components:

- Economic Security: this factor analyses the threat of poverty, unemployment, and the absence of publicly financed safety nets.
- Food Security: threats of any lack of food entitlements, including insufficient access to assets and work.
- Health security: threats of infectious diseases, lack of access to health care facilities including physical and mental health.
- Environmental security: lack of water availability and quality of water, air pollution, water and sanitation systems.
- Personal security: crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, violence and abuse.
- Community Security: breakdown of the family, collapse of cultures, ethnic discrimination, genocide and ethnic cleansing.
- Political security: government repression, systematic human rights violations.

Lebanon

Economic Security

There is a high percentage of illiteracy among Syrian refugees who are mostly settled in the poorest areas and work as unskilled laborers competing with the host communities. According to ILO statistics (2013)²² the impact of the refugees' influx was a 60% decline in wages, a more than 200% increase in rental costs in some cases, and a 15% increase in inflation rate and the prices of primary commodities. Additionally, without work permits the refugees accept lower wages due to high competition. Moreover, there is a 68% unemployment rate among refugee.²³ Furthermore, 78% of the refugees are not able to generate income.²⁴

The no-camp policy enforced by the Lebanese government forces refugees to rent shelters, and because of the high influx of refugees prices increased exponentially making this option unaffordable. The Lebanese government even dismantles informal tented settlements whenever they might become actual camps, which makes the situation even worse.

22 ILO (2013)

23 Ibid

24 Acaps (2015)

Food Security

Syrian refugees face lack of entitlement to food, i.e. they have insufficient access to assets and work due to the threat in economic security. According to Acaps (2015),²⁵ 13% of households experienced food shortage, and 27% lacked regular and sufficient nutritious food. Those residing in the poorest areas including Akkar are facing the worst situation.

Health security

Syrian refugees have access to public health services. However, public health services in Lebanon are in general of low quality and insufficient to cover the growing influx of refugees. With low level income and with high percentage of unemployment and the age range that needs health support the situation is even worse. Syrian refugees are suffering in terms of both their physical and mental health. According to Acaps (2015)²⁶ 89% of the Syrian youth suffer from depression and fear.

Environmental security

Those living with Palestinians in the refugee camps live in an environment that lacks sufficient water, with no sanitary services provided. Acaps (2015)²⁷ indicated that 33% of refugees lack access to drinking water; hence, many store water in containers risking transmission of infectious diseases. Other important environmental indicators to measure environmental security are shown in table (6) below.

Table 6.: Environmental Security indicators²⁸

Indicator	Percentage
Lacking access to drinking water	33%
Lacking access to place for washing	12%
Shared bathrooms with more than 15 people	7%

Personal security

Child labor is a concern among Syrian refugees, especially without access to schooling. Schooling is limited due to the inability to afford schooling fees, lack of physical access to schools, and change in the curriculum and educational system. This has led to a growing number of child beggars. More than 200,000 refugee children of school age are involved in child labor.²⁹ Females on the other hand face significant problems related

25 Ibid

26 Ibid

27 Ibid

28 Ibid

29 Ibid

to trafficking, discrimination, mistreat, early marriage and forced marriage justified by security reasons.³⁰

Additionally, several cases of social and communal tensions between the refugees and citizens erupted, causing hatred and non-acceptance of Syrian refugees in the country. The refugees issue is considered a security issue rather than a humanitarian one. The Lebanese even perceive that the lack of proper service provision is due to the refugees' impact on the economy, taking their jobs and decreasing the cost of labor. Syrian refugees also face threats and insecurity within the settlements in which they reside. According to Harb & Saab (2014)³¹ 32% do not feel safe due to crimes against their communities. Moreover, 10% have suffered harassment of some type.

Community Security

Fleeing from a conflict zone the Syrian refugees suffered the breakdown of families, often losing family members. This affected the family structure and the community structure. Living in Lebanon without a resident permit affects all aspects of life. Newborns do not receive birth certificates and become undocumented and therefore become stateless. Also, refugees have to work without contracts, hence they become subject to abuse. Syrian refugees face challenges related to social cohesion with the Lebanese nationals. Lebanese perceive Syrian refugees as a political and economic threat; many Lebanese nationals even support the curfews and political restrictions on the movement and entry of Syrian refugees. On the other hand, many Syrian refugees perceive INGOs as corrupt and Lebanese landlords and businessmen as corrupt.³²

Political security

Lebanon did not ratify the 1951 refugee convention; hence, it works in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the UNHCR. Additionally, Lebanon does not have a comprehensive legal framework regarding immigrants. The MOU between Lebanon and the UNHCR granted asylum seekers the right to reside in the country for three months, during which the UNHCR is to issue a final decision on refugee claims. Recognized refugees can stay for six to nine more months, during which a permanent solution must be reached.³³ With this agreement in place, the principle of non-refoulement is still not recognized; hence, refugees are regarded as illegal and may be arrested or deported.

Not being a party of the 1951 refugee convention, the Lebanese government did not allow the UNHCR to build formal tents. Therefore all refugees residing in camps live in informal settlements. The policy requires Syrians entering Lebanon to obtain visas and renew residency permits, which is demanding. Even a rental contract for their

³⁰ Bidinger et al. (2015)

³¹ Harb-Saab (2014)

³² Ibid

³³ UNHCR (2004)

residence is needed. However, it is not possible to get it as rental costs are very high, and for those who get a chance to rent a room, they are not able to obtain a contract as owners do not offer this document to evade taxation.

Jordan

Economic Security

Most of the Syrian refugees arrived from poor rural areas with low schooling. This affects the working conditions of the labor force and increases the unemployment rate, especially amongst women refugees and also contributes to the high rate of child labor. Hence, two out of three refugee households live below the absolute poverty line, and the average expenditure is 1.6 times greater than the income.³⁴

Due to the illegal status of refugees and the high competition between unskilled laborers and Jordanian nationals, working conditions have been affected. It had a direct effect on wage level, long working hours, poor health conditions, and lack of social security. All these factors affected health security, educational security and school enrollment, and the security in general. As a result, the social cohesion between the two communities severely deteriorated.

Food Security

Poverty, poor educational level, and unemployment affect the food security of Syrian refugees. As a result, 85% of refugees are not able to meet basic food needs without food aid. However, due to the limited capacity and the increasing number of refugees, the WFP is not able to cover the need.³⁵

Health security

Since November 2014, health services have not been provided for free, and with their limited financial capacity refugees are not able to afford health services. The refugee community is characterized by a high proportion of chronic or non-communicable diseases including diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.³⁶ Health services for handling such diseases are very expensive, which neither the refugees nor the local or international organizations can afford with the high influx. Moreover, due to the deteriorating conditions refugees are in need to receive mental and physical health services and counseling.

34 ACAPS (2015)

35 ACAPS (2015)

36 UNHCR (2014)

Environmental security

Jordan is one of the most water insecure nations. Citizens have to buy water from tanks; hence, drinking water depends on the purchasing capacity. Water insufficiency is an alarming condition even without the high influx of refugees. Refugees cannot afford paying for their water needs. Households receive water through networks less than once a week, and sewage services only cover one third of the population.³⁷ The resulting change added pressure on Jordan's scarcity of resources, and overburdened the government with the over-crowdedness of the communities and the additional public expenditure.

Personal security

There are several cases of human trafficking of women and girls, with low reporting rate, due to the conservative communities they come from. However, there is lack of shelter and counseling assistance for victims of trafficking and prostitution.³⁸ As a result, families encourage early marriages; one third of marriages are early marriages. There are even *survival sex* cases (selling daughters through marriage to men from the Gulf who will pay in return of having a wife).³⁹

Syrian children cannot access free public schooling unless registered with UNHCR. Hence, those seeking asylum remain with no schooling for a long period of time, making it difficult to cope in schools. Additionally, several discrimination cases were apparent in the schooling systems against the Syrian children either from classmates or teachers, and even from the schooling system.

Community Security

Syrian refugees are already suffering family breakdown due to ongoing conflict. They are suffering ethnic discrimination; they are pointed out as the unwelcomed and undesired. Discrimination is apparent in the labor market, school, street, and elsewhere. Discrimination affects social relations in a way that each community remains within the social borders they draw for themselves. Syrians live in Syrian neighborhoods to deal with family and friends only.

Most Syrian refugees are living within the local communities, only 17% of them residing in camps. The lack of social cohesion while living within the host communities makes the living conditions even harder. Table (7) below illustrates the distribution of Syrian refugees in urban areas and camps.

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ UNHCR (2013)

³⁹ WLUML (2013)

Table 7.: Distribution of Syrian refugees in urban areas and camps⁴⁰

Location	Number	Percentage
Urban	520,700	83.0%
Camps	106,587	17.0%

Political security

Jordan has not ratified the 1951 refugee convention; hence, it works in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the UNHCR. Additionally, Jordan does not have a comprehensive legal framework regarding immigrants. But, the constitution recognizes the existence of refugees along with the principle of non-refoulement. And Jordan considers Syrians as refugees. However, Jordan has exercised deportation of Syrians with the justification of national security concerns. As of January 2013, Jordan has implemented a non-admission policy for Palestinian refugees from Syria. In 2014, it also imposed strict restriction on all Syrians.

Conclusion

The influx of Syrian refugees affected the demography of the neighboring regions. It has affected the Lebanese structure in regards of population, age structure, sectarian and religious structure, and socio-economic structure. It has also affected the Jordanian population, age and socio-economic structure.

Apparently, the Syrian refugees are not being integrated within the host communities and they lack social cohesion. Tensions are taking place between citizens of host countries and Syrian refugees competing for the same services and same resources in nations that lack sufficient resources and efficient services. Syrian refugees compete for scarce resources such as water in Jordan. They compete over jobs, health services and educational services especially in Lebanon. These tensions are increasing with the growing number of refugees; hence, refugees feel insecure within the communities they are settling, and the host communities feel insecure too with the competitors being there and increasing.

The lack of human security of the Syrian refugees has been discussed through the seven criteria namely political security, personal security, health security, community security, food security, economic security, and environmental security. These could be summarized by the following three freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. With this analysis in hand, it is apparent that the host countries are not able to provide freedom from fear, freedom from want, or freedom to live in dignity while no real integration efforts have been made.

This article has also discussed the refugees' lack of human security in both hosting countries. It showed that refugees struggle to access basic services; they suffer from psy-

⁴⁰ UNHCR (2015)

chosocial distress, gender-based violence, school dropout and child labor. It also pointed out that the policies of both host countries do not ensure human security for the refugees, and that the international community intervention does not meet the growing need for support. Specifically, it revealed that the domestic law, policies and practices do not adhere to the international law regarding refugees. All these factors along with the ongoing deteriorating situation in Syria are making the conditions worse day after day.

The lack of human security amongst refugees and the impact it has on the demographic structure of both communities will ultimately affect the national security within the host countries. This is prevalent through the attitudes of both communities and through the conflict that has been rising since the influx started. Hence, national security of both Jordan and Lebanon are under risk and intervention to resolve the issue is urgent. The conflict is being extended to reach the host countries, and the situation will deteriorate if the problem is not resolved on three levels. The first level is the root of the problem, which is the Syrian conflict. The second level is the refugee case, a resolution should be provided that contributes to services securing the refugees through the different elements of human security. The third level includes the systems of the host countries that help provide the services efficiently in compliance with international law.

It is evident that the national security of the host countries is under risk, and the risk factors are the refugees' lack of human security and the demographic changes.




Figure 3.: Factors affecting National Security of Host Countries

Recommendations

Without changes in the host countries and without comprehending the lack of human security of the refugees, conflict will erupt in those host countries. Hence, the following is recommended to ensure the human security of the refugees:

Host Country Level:

- Formalize refugee legislations in the host countries to provide protection whether temporary or permanent.
- Accede to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
- Accede to the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of Statelessness.
- Adopt a Refugee Law and establish a national asylum system.
- Ensure the respect of the non-refoulement principle and its codification in the policies and laws.
- And, ensure equal access to education and health services, social benefits, and the different public services.

Additionally, on the level of the international community, the following is recommended:

- Coordinated provision of support to ensure the sufficiency of the basic services of refugees.
- Develop an emergency plan that considers all dimensions of human security including economic security, health security, food security, environmental personal security, community security, political security.
- Moreover, the roots of the problem should be resolved in a manner that decreases the influx of refugees and provides support to those remaining in Syria while considering the political intervention to help resolve the Syrian case.

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ÖSSZEGRZÉS

Demográfiai változások és a szíriai menekültek humán biztonsága

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A szíriai polgárháború kitörése óta jelentős demográfiai változások történtek a régióban. A szíriai menekült családok kisebbségi etnikai csoportok tagjaivá válnak Jordániában és Libanonban. A tanulmány bemutatja, hogy a menekültáradat hatással van ezen országok életkori összetételére, a populációs arányokra és a helyi közösségek társadalmi és strukturális arányaira. Hasonlóképpen kihatással van Libanon szektáriánusi és vallási egyensúlyára. A cikk bemutatja, hogy a nemzetközi közösség migrációt támogató erőfeszítései ellenére a régióban a humán biztonság hiányzik. Az írás azt is bizonyítja, hogy a demográfiai változások a befogadó államokban nemcsak a menekültek humán biztonságára vannak kedvezőtlen hatással, de kihatnak maguknak az országoknak a biztonságára is.